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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the recent performance of the main Latin American economies (Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru). In the first three quarters of 2019 the region’s 
growth was once again lower than expected and below that of other emerging areas of reference. 
This lower growth is essentially explained by domestic factors (political and economic policy 
uncertainty and structural problems of low potential growth), although the external environment 
has not been favourable either in terms of developments in world demand and in the terms of 
trade. Most central banks in the region have reduced policy interest rates given the absence of 
inflationary pressures, the existence of negative output gaps and the relatively stable performance 
of exchange rates. Fiscal space is limited in most of the economies and certain risks to the 
sustainability of their public finances persist in some of them. The main international organisations 
and private institutions expect activity to rise in the coming quarters, especially domestic demand. 
This would be based on looser financial conditions and improved external conditions (lower trade 
tensions) and domestic conditions (agents’ confidence). In this setting, the balance of risks is 
tilted downwards, given the persisting doubts about economic policies in the main countries in 
the region and about the dissipation of political uncertainty, and about the improvement of the 
international economic situation. 
This report includes two boxes. Box 1 analyses the channels which could be transmitting global 
trade tensions to Latin America. Box 2 describes the economic situation in Argentina after the 
worsening of the financial turmoil last summer.
Keywords: low growth, political and economic policy uncertainty, trade tensions, monetary 
policy, fiscal space.
JEL codes: F01, F21, F30, F41.
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Introduction
During the first half of 2019 the main Latin American economies continued to 
show weak growth which was lower than that of other emerging economies and 
below that projected at the beginning of the year. Noteworthy is the situation of 
Argentina’s economy, which continued to contract. The main features of the 
external environment were a slowdown of the activity of the main trading partners, 
commodity prices that were generally below their pre-2014 highs and continued 
accommodative financial conditions, aside from some isolated bouts of volatility. 
Domestic demand, especially investment, was adversely affected by the 
uncertainty surrounding economic policies and the domestic tensions in several 
countries in the region. The current account deficit was corrected in Argentina 
and widened in other countries. 
As for demand-side economic policies, almost all of the central banks decided to 
reduce policy interest rates and further cuts are expected against a backdrop of 
global monetary policy easing. The more accommodative stance has been possible 
since inflation remains in line with targets, inflation expectations are generally 
anchored, exchange rates remain relatively stable and there is spare capacity in the 
economies. Fiscal policy has limited scope, should the above-mentioned risks to 
growth materialise, and, in certain cases, there is concern about the sustainability of 
public finances. 
The available projections of the main international organisations and private 
institutions continue to indicate that in coming quarters activity, especially domestic 
demand, will recover, albeit to a limited extent. This would be based on looser 
financial conditions and improved external and internal conditions (a recovery in 
agents’ confidence). In this setting, the balance of risks is tilted downwards, and the 
risks stem from the external environment (insofar as trade tensions do not dissipate 
and there is a greater slowdown in the global economy) and from specific problems 
in certain countries arising from potentially more protracted political and economic 
policy uncertainty in the main countries in the region.
Recent macro-financial developments and the outlook for the region are analysed 
below. The report includes two boxes. Box 1 examines the potential effects of global 
trade tensions on Latin America and the attendant transmission channels are 
underlined. Box 2 analyses the economic situation in Argentina after the worsening 
of the financial turmoil in August. 
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The economic and financial setting of Latin America
Weak global activity
Since the publication of the last half-yearly report on the Latin American economy, 
in May 2019, the world economy has remained weak, which has prompted a 
downward revision of global growth expectations for this year (see Chart 1.1). This 
is the lowest growth rate since the international financial crisis, which reflects 
weak manufacturing sectors, on the supply side, and weak investment and foreign 
trade (see Chart 1.2), on the demand side. The heightening of geopolitical and 
trade tensions is one of the main factors present behind this weakness, in 
particular, the increase in bilateral tariffs between the United States and China,1 
the effects of which on the Latin American economies are analysed in Box 1 of 
this report.
As a result of lower global growth, the prices of commodities, the main exports of 
the Latin American economies (as shown by Chart 1.3), have remained considerably 
lower than the highs recorded in 2013-14 (see Chart 1.4).
Absence of inflationary pressures and more accommodative monetary 
policies
This slowdown of activity in recent quarters together with commodity price 
developments, subdued profit margins and the absence of significant wage increases 
have eased inflationary pressures in most advanced and emerging economies (see 
Chart 1.5). Developments in activity and inflation, and future risks to these variables 
have led the central banks of many of the advanced economies to adopt a more 
accommodative monetary policy. This has made it easier for many emerging 
economies to cut policy interest rates (see Chart 1.6), given that their exchange rates 
are also relatively stable.
Relaxed financial conditions
This more accommodative monetary policy stance contributed to continued 
accommodative financial conditions globally, which were partly supported by 
lower bond yields. Nevertheless, the main financial markets were notably volatile 
in recent months, which was probably linked to the ups and downs in trade 
negotiations.
1  Banco de España (2019), “Rising protectionism between the United States and China and its effects on the 
global economy”, Box 2, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2019.
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The weakness of the world economy, partly explained by the negative performance of trade, led to the downward revision of growth for this 
year. Prices of commodities (the main exports of most Latin American economies) generally held below their levels in the period 2005-2017. 
As a result of the absence of inflationary pressures and weak activity, the central banks of developed and emerging economies adopted more 
accommodative monetary policies.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Chart 1
SOURCES: Consensus Forecasts, CPB World Trade Monitor, OECD and Thomson Reuters.
a Latin America 6: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Latin America 5: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Weighted 
by the purchasing power parity method.
b The food, beverages and tobacco heading is included in the agriculture aggregate and not in manufacturing, unlike in the original source 
(OECD).
c Mining includes oil extraction.
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Macro-financial developments in Latin America
Financial markets in Latin America were less affected by the ups and 
downs in trade negotiations
Although they share the general features of the financial market developments of 
other emerging economies, stock market indices in Latin America were less affected 
by external factors relating to the ups and downs in trade negotiations (see Chart 2.1). 
This could be linked to the region having a lower degree of trade openness than 
other emerging areas, as well as to the higher proportion of commodities, as opposed 
to manufactured products, in foreign trade. Likewise, portfolio capital flows 
performed more benignly than in other emerging economies (see Chart 2.2). Other 
notable aspects in financial market developments in Latin America are that they 
were not specifically affected by the negative performance of Argentina’s economy 
(see Charts  2.3 and 2.4) and that exchange rates remained relatively stable 
(see Chart 2.5). In fact, financial conditions2 eased for almost all the countries in the 
region during 2019, which was also the case in the developed economies (see 
Chart 2.6).
The growth rate of activity continues to disappoint owing to the stall in 
domestic demand
The overall activity of the main Latin American economies continued to grow at 
low rates in general in the first half of 2019, with the region posting quarter-on-
quarter growth rates of -0.1% and 0.4%, respectively, in the first two quarters of 
the year (see Table  1 and Chart  3.1).3 Thus, GDP once again stood below the 
projections of various institutions and it was the emerging region where growth 
for 2019 was revised downwards most (see, again, Chart 1.1). As in 2018 Q4, in the 
first half of 2019 the region’s scant growth was due to the positive contribution of 
external demand (as can be seen in Chart  3.2). A significant share of this 
performance of external demand is explained by the fall in imports. This was 
mainly as a result of the weakening of all domestic demand components: private 
consumption since mid-2018; government consumption, which began to post 
negative growth rates; and investment, which plummeted in Argentina, has not 
recovered in Brazil (after falling more than 25% in the 2015-2016 recession) and 
has not taken off in Mexico.
2  See Banco de España (2018), “Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2018”, Analytical 
Articles, Economic Bulletin, 2/2018, for a description of how these indices are calculated for Latin American 
economies.
3   In Venezuela, where official data on activity reach 2019 Q1, the higher-frequency indicators indicate that the 
economy remains immersed in a deep recession.
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Financial markets in Latin America were less affected by the ups and downs in the US-Sino trade negotiations than those in other emerging 
regions. The bouts of financial volatility in Argentina did not affect the other markets in the region. Financial conditions eased in all the 
countries and remained loose compared to previous financial conditions, except for in Argentina.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Chart 2
SOURCES: Banco de España, Thomson Reuters and JP Morgan.
a Aggregate index of seven largest advanced economies in the world: Germany, Canada, United States, France, Italy, Japan and United 
Kingdom.
b Sovereign spread (EMBI+) in basis points.
c Aggregate index of exchange rate of emerging economies vis-à-vis the dollar. A fall indicates depreciation.
d An increase indicates a contraction of financial conditions. Weekly data. For greater details on the methodology, see “Report on the Latin 
American economy. First half of 2018”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 2/2018, Banco de España, section 2.
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Economic policy uncertainty is a significant factor in weak domestic 
demand
Rising economic policy uncertainty in certain countries and doubts about global 
trade relations, in addition to certain temporary factors in some countries,4 have 
played a significant role among the domestic factors which have had a negative 
effect on activity. In the case of Latin America, however, economic policy uncertainty 
(see Chart 3.3) seems to have been more significant, particularly in some countries, 
since the available indicators on the uncertainty over trade tensions showed more 
moderate developments than in the world economy as a whole (see Chart 3.4). The 
differentiating external factor with respect to other emerging economies which may 
have had a negative impact on Latin America is developments in commodity prices, 
which in almost all cases held at levels below those recorded in the years after the 
financial crisis (see again, Chart 1.4).
2019 will be another year of lower-than-expected GDP growth
Growth in 2019 will probably be lower than in 2018 (1.4%), at levels of less than 1% 
(see Chart 3.5 which includes the consensus forecasts of analysts). The downward 
revisions for this year are explained not only by the worse-than-expected performance 
in the first half of the year (only bar the positive surprises in Colombia) but also by 
the limited buoyancy of the higher-frequency indicators published for the second 
half and the plummeting of forecasts in the case of Argentina (see Box 2). Activity is 
projected to rise modestly in 2020 with domestic demand components estimated to 
perform more positively, underpinned by a degree of cyclical slack, continued 
relatively loose financial conditions, an assumed easing of global trade tensions and 
an improvement in domestic agents’ confidence, as well as the absence of significant 
imbalances in several of these economies, as is analysed below.
Growth continues below potential and remains lower than in other 
emerging regions
The region’s GDP growth in 2019 and 2020 is estimated to stand once again below 
potential, with the result that the negative output gap will continue to widen, although 
the latter differs in size across the different economies. Growth in Latin America has 
been below potential since 2012 and is currently even further off this potential than in 
other emerging regions (see Chart 3.6). This is especially the case in Argentina and 
Brazil in view of their deep recessions. The region’s lower potential growth with respect 
4  For example, the Brumadinho dam disaster in Brazil in January, the strikes and fuel shortage in Mexico, and 
the adverse weather conditions which affected mining output in Chile.
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LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Table 1
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Thomson Reuters and national statistics.
a The six economies shown represent 84% of the total of Latin America and the Caribbean (IMF).
b GDP of Latin America 6 weighted using the purchasing power parity method. The weightings for 2018 are: Brazil, 39.4%; Mexico, 30.1%; 
Argentina, 10.7%; Colombia, 8.7%; Chile, 5.6%, and Peru, 5.4%.
c Seasonally adjusted.
d Latin America 5: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Argentina is not included because its central bank does not have inflation targets.
e Four-quarter moving average.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 2019 2020
GDP (year-on-year rate)
8.17.00.11.00.14.12.12.24.15.2)b( )a( 6 aciremA nitaL    
3.1-1.3-7.08.5-1.6-7.3-8.3-1.45.2-3.2anitnegrA    
0.29.00.15.01.13.19.02.11.10.2lizarB    
3.14.03.01.06.15.26.12.20.21.2)c( ocixeM    
0.35.29.16.16.36.23.57.40.42.3elihC    
6.34.34.37.27.26.24.25.26.29.3)c( aibmoloC    
6.36.22.14.27.45.25.52.30.42.5ureP    
CPI (year-on-year rate)
2.36.39.37.31.42.45.36.38.39.4)d( 5 aciremA nitaL    
5.38.33.41.41.44.43.38.27.39.5lizarB    
1.38.32.41.48.49.46.43.59.41.4ocixeM    
8.22.22.28.19.21.36.25.27.25.3elihC    
7.36.33.31.33.31.32.34.32.33.4 aibmoloC    
9.12.25.21.21.23.10.19.03.12.3ureP    
Budget balance (% of GDP) (e)
    Latin America 6 (a) (b) -3.0 -4.5 -4.9 -4.8 -4.7 -4.5 -4.2 -3.9 -4.6 -4.1
7.2-0.4-3.4-7.4-0.5-8.4-1.5-7.5-0.5-8.1-anitnegrA    
9.6-5.7-5.6-0.7-1.7-2.7-3.7-4.7-1.7-6.4-lizarB    
6.2-8.2-6.1-7.1-1.2-5.2-7.2-8.2-1.2-3.2-ocixeM    
1.2-2.2-8.1-8.1-7.1-1.2-6.2-7.2-7.1-0.0elihC    
9.0-7.1-9.1-8.2-1.3-1.4-3.3-9.2-1.3-8.2- aibmoloC    
4.1-5.1-0.2-9.1-0.2-0.2-3.2-2.3-0.2-3.0-ureP    
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (a) (b) 44.9 60.7 56.0 58.5 60.3 59.4 60.5 —
8.083.395.663.089.378.383.663.459.585.44 anitnegrA    
9.396.197.878.872.777.774.774.572.777.85lizarB    
6.458.355.645.649.645.644.747.649.649.63ocixeM    
2.925.728.720.626.520.524.420.426.523.21elihC    
0.940.15—6.749.649.540.545.341.745.63 aibmoloC    
2.729.628.523.527.529.326.328.327.526.32ureP    
Current account balance (% of GDP) (e)
    Latin America 6 (a) (b) -2.0 -2.2 -1.8 -2.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.6 -1.5
3.02.1-4.3-4.4-1.5-9.5-6.5-2.5-3.5-9.0-anitnegrA    
0.1-2.1-5.1-2.1-2.1-3.1-1.1-9.0-2.1-3.2-lizarB    
6.1-2.1-9.0-6.1-8.1-8.1-7.1-6.1-8.1-6.1-ocixeM    
9.2-5.3-6.3-3.3-1.3-2.2-8.1-6.1-1.3-1.1-elihC    
0.4-2.4-2.4-2.4-9.3-3.3-2.3-0.3-9.3-5.3- aibmoloC    
0.2-9.1-9.1-7.1-6.1-8.1-4.1-3.1-6.1-7.2-ureP    
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (a) (b) 26.7 36.8 34.8 34.1 34.7 36.8 38.1 —
8.067.556.152.342.148.834.355.43anitnegrA    
5.833.735.533.332.233.336.535.52lizarB    
1.820.829.729.721.824.829.721.02ocixeM    
—6.368.161.062.953.368.168.84elihC    
7.145.049.935.839.839.939.935.72 aibmoloC    
5.638.535.433.332.335.435.432.23ureP    
MEMORANDUM ITEMS - Aggregate of Latin America and the Caribbean (International Monetary Fund):
    GDP (year-on-year rate) 2.4 1.0
    CPI (year-on-year rate) 5.1 6.2
    Budget balance (% of GDP) -3.6 -4.9
    Public debt (% of GDP) 49.9 67.8
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.8 -1.9
    External debt (% of GDP) 32.8 48.0
    Weight in world GDP, in PPP (%) 8.5 7.5
 2007-2017
Average
2018
IMF Projections
 (WEO October 2019)
91028102
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Activity in the main Latin American economies grew at a low rate in the first half of 2019, as a result of subdued domestic demand, partly 
owing to the effect of greater uncertainty over economic and trade policies. Growth forecasts were revised downwards again, especially in 
2019. This year and next year, the region’s growth rate will be below potential, increasing the spare capacity of the economies, which is much 
larger than in other emerging regions.
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 3
SOURCES: IMF, Economic Policy Uncertainty, World Trade Uncertainty, Latin American Consensus Forecasts and Thomson Reuters.
a Latin America 6: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Latin America 4: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Weighted by 
the purchasing power parity method.
b The shaded areas relate to the country with the highest or lowest growth forecast at any given time.
c The longest-term IMF forecast available at that time (five years) is taken for each year to estimate potential growth.
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to other emerging areas (especially in comparison with Asia) is associated with lower 
commodity prices5 and a slower pace of implementation of structural reforms in Latin 
American economies in recent years.6 These developments are hindering and even 
reversing income per capita convergence with the group of developed economies. 
Balance of risks tilted downwards
The baseline scenario for developments in activity in the coming quarters is subject 
to several downside risks. On the domestic side, Argentina’s situation is uncertain, 
especially due to the incoming government’s lack of specification of economic 
policies. Political uncertainty also affects Chile, following the recent social tension, 
and Peru, given the ongoing institutional crisis. In Mexico uncertainty also remains 
high about the course of the economic policies to be implemented, for example, the 
type of private-sector participation in oil extraction and the approval of a new free 
trade agreement with the United States and Canada. As for Brazil, after the approval 
of the pension reform needed to avoid government debt from following an 
unsustainable course, it is still not clear how the Government’s reform agenda will 
unfold in controversial areas such as tax reform and greater openness to trade. In 
addition to domestic economic policy-related risks, developments in trade tensions 
and a possible deepening of the global slowdown, particularly of the US and Chinese 
economies, are sources of risks which are difficult to quantify and which could alter 
international financial conditions and commodity prices.
The absence of inflationary pressures in most countries in the region 
has led central banks to cut policy interest rates
In countries with inflation targets, inflation has been within the target range (see 
Table 2 and Chart 4.1). Inflation expectations remain anchored around this range. 
Also taking into account the negative output gaps in all these countries7 as well as 
the easing of monetary policy in the main advanced countries, the logic behind 
the central bank’s decision to cut policy interest rates in recent months in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru is understandable (see Chart  4.2). As a result of these 
monetary policy actions, the real interest rate is lower than the natural rate of 
5   I. Kataryniuk and J. Martínez-Martín (2019), “TFP Growth and Commodity Prices in Emerging Economies”, 
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, show that the performance of total factor productivity (TFP) is partly 
explained by changes in commodity prices: on average, a fall of 10% in commodity export prices would be 
associated with a  fall  of 0.4  to 0.7 percentage points  (pp)  in  short-term TFP growth. That  is, potential 
growth would have been overestimated in the periods of rising commodity prices which, furthermore, were 
higher than their historical averages.
6  See Chapter 3 of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, October 2019.
7   According  to  the habitual  statistical  calculation methods using Hodrick-Prescott  filters and  the  inflation 
reports published by various central banks.
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interest,8 except for in Mexico, where inflation held for many quarters above the 
upper bound of the target range, and in Colombia. Further cuts in official interest 
rates are expected in the coming months, except for, once again, in Colombia. 
However, this expected scenario of greater monetary easing requires some 
stability in exchange rates since, if international financial conditions became 
tighter, compliance with inflation targets may be jeopardised, apart from the 
potential risks to financial stability.
The main challenges facing the Latin American economies
Correction of the external imbalance in Argentina and widening of the 
external imbalance in Colombia and Chile
The total current account deficit of the Latin American economy stood at similar 
levels to those of the previous year, whereas other emerging economies strengthened 
their surplus (see Chart 5.1). By country, the current account deficit narrowed sharply 
in Argentina in recent quarters, which could be linked to the recession in this country 
since the beginning of 2018 and the notable depreciation of its currency, whereas in 
Chile and Colombia, it is widening and stands close to 4% of GDP, against a 
LATIN AMERICAN INFLATION
Year-on-year rates of change (%)
Table 2
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, national statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a Argentina suspended its monetary policy framework based on inflation targeting and adopted a monetary policy based on monetary base growth 
limits.
b October 2019 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year.
c Brazil's inflation target is 4.25% ± 1.5 pp for 2019 and 4.00% ±1.5 pp for 2020.
2020
)b( snoitatcepxE)b( snoitatcepxErebmetpeStnemlifluFrebmeceDtegraT)a( yrtnuoC
  7.3  4.3  9.2seY8.35.1 ± 5.4)c( lizarB    
  5.3  1.3  0.3oN8.41 ± 3ocixeM    
  8.2  6.2  1.2seY6.21 ± 3elihC    
  4.3  7.3  8.3seY2.31 ± 3aibmoloC    
  2.2  0.2  9.1seY2.23 – 1ureP    
91028102
8   According to the estimates of the region’s various central banks. See, inter alia: Banco Central de Brasil, 
Box entitled “Structural interest rates and monetary policy in Brazil”, Inflation Report, September 2017; 
Banco Central de Chile, Box V.2 “Natural rate of interest”, Monetary Policy Report, June 2019; Colombia, 
Box 2 “New Estimates of the Neutral Interest Rates in Colombia”, Inflation Report, September 2018; 
Mexico, Box 4 “Update to the Estimate of the Long-Term Neutral Interest Rate in Mexico”, Quarterly Report, 
April – June 2019; Peru, Box 4 “Re-estimations of the potential output and natural interest rate” Inflation 
Report, September 2019.
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background of negative output gaps in both economies. The external debt of all the 
large economies continued to grow in the last quarter (see Table 1). 
The current account balance of Latin American economies is 
essentially determined not only by their relative position in the 
economic cycle but also by developments in commodity prices
Unlike events in other emerging regions, in the last decade the usual negative 
correlation between the position in the economic cycle and the current account 
balance has not been observed in the main Latin American economies (see Chart 5.2). 
In these economies the trade and income balances are highly influenced by commodity 
prices (see Charts  5.3 and 5.4). Higher commodity prices increase domestic 
producers’ exports, and income outflows, since the profits of foreign-owned 
producers rise. Therefore, commodity price developments constitute another crucial 
variable when explaining the current account balances of Latin American economies.
Fiscal space in the region is generally low
Despite the correction in recent quarters in the primary balances, Argentina and, 
especially, Brazil continue to run high government deficits, which are largely 
Inflation stands close to the target range and is expected to continue to do so in the coming quarters since inflation expectations are well 
anchored, exchange rates are relatively stable and spare capacity remains in the economies. In recent months, the central banks, in tandem 
with the more accommodative monetary policy stance in the developed economies and, bar Colombia, have cut policy interest rates and are 
expected to continue to do so in the coming quarters.
INFLATION AND POLICY INTEREST RATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 4
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters.
a Aggregate of the five countries with inflation targets: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, weighted by the purchasing power parity 
method.
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explained by debt servicing costs (see Chart 6.1). Furthermore, these two countries 
have very high public debt-to-GDP ratios (see Chart 6.2). In the case of Brazil, it is 
due to government deficits having built up in recent years and, in that of Argentina, 
it is on account of the depreciation of the Argentine peso since close to 80% of its 
debt is denominated in foreign currencies, mainly dollars. In order to address the 
situation in Brazil, the legislature approved a pension system reform given the 
projections of increased expenditure. However, the effects of that reform will be 
seen in public finances in the longer term and the reduction of the government 
The external imbalances in the main economies in the region continue.
EXTERNAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 5
SOURCES: IMF and Thomson Reuters.
a Four-quarter moving average, until 2019 Q2.
b Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, weighted by the purchasing power parity method. The countries 
marked for Latin America refer to 2018.
c Includes China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey, Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Croatia.
d For each country, the price of the most significant commodity in exports and total goods exports in each year from 2006 to 2018 are 
shown. It is soya for Argentina and Brazil, copper for Chile and Peru, and oil for Colombia.
e For each country, the price of the most significant commodity in exports and the net income balance in each year from 2006 to 2018 is 
shown. An increase in the income balance represents a more negative balance.
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deficit, which will be linked to the expected improvement in the economy, may not 
be sufficient to correct the structural situation of public finances. In the case of 
Argentina, government debt maturities have been rescheduled for some bonds, as 
described in Box 2. This means a much smaller reduction in the present value of the 
debt than that implied by the market price of government debt securities. In short, 
the space for implementing expansionary fiscal policies, if necessary, seems highly 
constrained in these two countries.
Mexico’s fiscal policy does not have significant room for manoeuvre either, given the 
delicate situation of the state-owned oil company PEMEX, which could ultimately 
Both the government deficit and government debt have remained very high in Brazil and Argentina; furthermore, Argentina’s debt structure 
is highly dependent on the exchange rate. The ratios recorded in the other countries are comparable with those of emerging Asia and higher 
than those of Eastern Europe, although there are implicit risks such as the high debt of the state-owned oil company PEMEX in Mexico.
FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 6
SOURCES: IMF, Institute of International Finance, Thomson Reuters and national statistics.
a Light shading, primary deficit; dark shading, interest burden. The dots represent the total government balance.
b IMF’s estimates from the October 2019 WEO.
c Light shading, debt in local currency; dark shading, debt in foreign currency. The dotted line represents average total debt in the period 
2000-2018.
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affect the sustainability of government debt, as described in the previous half-yearly 
report on the Latin American economies.9 In the case of Colombia, where government 
debt remains high in historic terms, the country has to address greater public 
expenditure arising from the significant increase in immigration (from Venezuela with 
a cost estimated by the Colombian government of around 0.5 pp of GDP in 2019). 
This is at odds with the application of the fiscal rule which would require a reduction 
of the structural government deficit in the coming years. Although government debt 
remains low in Chile, it has increased notably in recent years and will foreseeably 
continue to do so, as the Government has announced certain expansionary fiscal 
measures in response to social protest, which have yet to be determined. Finally, the 
approval of possible countercyclical fiscal policy measures in Peru could be hindered 
by its current complicated institutional situation.
Data cut-off date: 5.11.2019. 
Date of publication: 7.11.2019.
9   Banco de España (2019), Box 1, “The measures proposed by the new governments of Brazil and Mexico”, 
in the “Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2019”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 
2/2019.
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As from 2018, trade tensions have heightened, particularly 
between the United States and China, with adverse 
effects on the global economy.1 In this setting, Box 1 
describes the channels through which this situation could 
affect Latin America and estimates its possible effects.
The trade channel is the most salient of these channels. 
The lower activity in countries directly affected by the 
“trade war” may lead to a reduction in their demand for 
goods produced in the rest of the world, including Latin 
America. Likewise, the tensions may disrupt the global 
value chains (GVC) into which the Latin American 
countries are integrated. Furthermore, trade flows 
between the United States and China may be diverted 
through third jurisdictions, which could have a positive 
effect on certain exports. Finally, given the importance, 
in particular, of Chinese demand in determining 
commodity prices, a further slowdown of this economy 
may affect these markets with significant impacts on 
Latin America. In addition to the trade channel, negative 
effects may arise if the tensions affect agents’ investment 
and consumption decisions by reducing their confidence 
in the economic situation, as a result of uncertainty over 
the future nature of multilateral trade relations or due to 
their lower expectations about the future course of 
activity.
Moving onto the possible materialisation of trade tensions 
in Latin America, it should be noted, first, that this region’s 
economies, as a whole, are less open to international 
trade than other emerging areas: their goods exports 
account for slightly less than 20% of GDP, compared with 
figures of around 50% for emerging economies in Eastern 
Europe or South East Asia (see Chart 1.1). However, there 
is a high degree of heterogeneity in the region. The degree 
of openness of the Argentine, Brazilian and Colombian 
economies is below average, nevertheless, China and the 
United States are the destination of almost half of the total 
value of Colombia’s exports (see Chart 1.3). By contrast, 
the degree of openness of the Peruvian, Chilean and 
Mexican economies is higher; Peru and Chile are 
considerably exposed to China, as is Mexico to the United 
States (see again, Chart 1.3).
The region’s lower degree of openness is reflected in its 
lower integration into GVC compared with other emerging 
regions (see Chart 1.2), but the pattern is heterogeneous 
across the countries. Mexico is more closely tied to US 
industry, whereas regional links predominate in the 
structure of the South American economies.2 However, 
since the breakdown of the exports of the Latin American 
economies, except for Mexico, largely comprises 
commodities (see again, Chart 1.3), they are more 
exposed to the possible effects of lower demand from the 
United States and China, as mining products and 
agricultural goods have considerably higher trade 
elasticities than manufactured products. Similarly, as 
mentioned above, the region’s terms of trade are very 
closely tied to fluctuations in international commodity 
prices which are largely determined by the Chinese 
economy’s activity and demand (see Chart 1.4).
Trade tensions seem to be negatively influencing the 
global goods trade, particularly since end-2018 (see Chart 
1.5) by affecting exports of commodities and manufactured 
goods. In this setting, Latin America has followed the 
pattern of other emerging economies and its exports fell 
throughout 2019. However, Mexico, with an export 
structure more focused on manufactured goods, has 
continuously posted positive rates of change throughout 
the year (see again, Chart 1.5). A recent report by the 
Banco de México3 attributes part of these developments 
to a slight substitution effect of those Chinese exports to 
the United States which are affected most by the new 
tariffs.4 However, the Banco de México points out that in 
the medium and long term the trade tensions could also 
trigger adverse effects for Mexico’s economy through the 
channel of uncertainty. 
Accordingly, however, based on the available data it is 
difficult to estimate the specific economic impact of the 
various waves of tariff increases since certain measures 
have only come into force recently or are pending 
Box 1
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE TENSIONS ON LATIN AMERICA
1  In particular, both the IMF, in the World Economic Outlook of October 2018 and the OECD, in the Economic Outlook of April 2019, 
envisage negative impacts relating to the trade shocks. See also, “Rising protectionism between the United States and China and 
its effects on the global economy”, Box 2, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2019, Banco de España.
2   See CEPAL (2013), “América Latina y el Caribe en las cadenas internacionales de valor”, Serie Comercio Internacional.
3   See Banco de México (2019), “Quarterly Report”, January-March 2019.
4   These results are similar to those obtained by some international institutions. See UNCTAD (2018), “Key Statistics and Trends in 
Trade Policy – 2018”.
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Box 1
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE TENSIONS ON LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
In terms of the trade channel, the region shows considerable heterogeneity as regards the degree of trade openness, of exposure to the 
United States and China, and of integration into global value chains. The high proportion of exports of commodities is a particularly significant 
factor also on account of the importance of Chinese demand in determining their prices. In the short term, trade tensions are estimated to 
have negatively influenced developments in global trade activities and in Latin America. Mexico stands out for having maintained positive 
export growth rates. Also, higher uncertainty over trade policy and the global economic situation may have a negative effect on the financial 
markets of emerging economies, in general, and on the Latin American economies, in particular.
SOURCES: OECD, UNCTAD-Eora GVC database, WTO and Thomson Reuters.
a LA: aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. EE: Eastern Europe (EU 13). ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
b Upstream: proportion of exports used as an input by industries in other countries, which produce goods or services for export to third countries 
(value-added indirect exports). Downstream: proportion of exports comprising the value added of foreign goods and services used as inputs to 
produce goods and services for export.
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implementation. To approximate the possible economic 
impact on the Latin American economy a simulation 
exercise using a macroeconometric model5 has been 
conducted. Chart 1.6 shows two scenarios. The first 
scenario includes the transmission channels of changes in 
global trade (arising from the increase in tariffs between the 
United States and China in various phases), whereas the 
second scenario adds as well the changes arising from 
Box 1
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE TENSIONS ON LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
SOURCES: OECD, UNCTAD-Eora GVC database, WTO and Thomson Reuters.
c LA 5: aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
d All the tariff measures between the United States and China, which have been introduced or were announced until December, are included. The 
effect of uncertainty is approximated by increases in the risk premium of 25 basis points (bp) for the United States and China, and of 10 bp for 
the rest of the world.
TRADE TENSIONS MAY GENERATE SPILLOVERS TO LATIN AMERICA THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS (cont.)
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5   Specifically, the NiGEM model of the UK National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The effect of the tariffs announced by 
the United States and China since May this year was simulated, regardless of whether they have already been applied. For more 
details on the simulation framework, see “Rising protectionism between the United States and China and its effects on the global 
economy”, Box 2, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2019, Banco de España.
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declining confidence and rising uncertainty.6 According to 
the simulations, in the first scenario Latin America’s GDP 
would decrease by 0.3%, in cumulative terms in 2019-2021, 
0.1 pp less than that of the emerging Asia region, given its 
lower degree of trade openness and its lower integration 
into GVC. In the second scenario, the confidence effects 
could ultimately trigger additional adverse impacts (of 
0.1 pp for both regions), not only owing to the direct effect 
of higher investment risk premia but also owing to the 
second-round effect on global activity.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty-related impacts are 
particularly difficult to calibrate and, therefore, must be 
regarded with more caution than those associated with 
the trade channel. Similarly, two factors should be noted 
among those that produce different effects to those 
presented. First, the simulations performed do not take 
into account the expansionary reaction of monetary 
policies globally and regionally, which has already 
begun, and which would tend to reduce the magnitude 
of the impact. Second, the macroeconometric model 
used includes commodity price elasticities that are 
lower than those estimated in the empirical literature7 
which, given Latin America’s export specialisation 
discussed above, could introduce downward bias in the 
results.
Box 1
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL TRADE TENSIONS ON LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
6   This channel is approximated through an ad hoc increase of 25 basis points (bp) in the investment risk premium in the United States 
and China, and of 10 bp in the other economies.
7   See the discussion  in X. Bin, D. Santabárbara and M. Roth  (2019), “Global  impact of a slowdown  in China”, Analytical Articles, 
Economic Bulletin, Banco de España,  forthcoming. These authors refine the channel of  the  impact of changes  in the economic 
situation on commodities in two main dimensions. First, they calibrate differently the reaction of commodity prices to a fall in China’s 
industrial  output.  Second,  they  recalibrate  the  parameters  of  the  NiGEM model  on  the  elasticity  of  the  supply  of  the  various 
commodities,  in order to calculate the fall  in the value of output associated with lower prices, differentiating between oil and the 
various types of industrial metals, using the estimates available in the economic literature of reference.
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Capital inflows into Argentina came to a sudden halt in 
Spring 2018. When faced with the impossibility of raising 
funding on international markets, the Government decided 
to request financial assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The main reasons for this situation 
were:1 i) the lack of progress in reducing the government 
deficit (mainly financed with foreign currency-denominated 
external debt) and inflation; ii) the widespread tightening of 
international financial conditions, and iii) a severe drought, 
which significantly reduced agricultural output temporarily 
in 2018 Q2, with an impact on the quarter-on-quarter rate 
of change in GDP of –2.2 percentage points (pp).2
The programme with the IMF, which was approved in June 
2018 and modified in October 2018 to increase in size and 
bring forward the disbursement of the amounts committed 
(see Table 1), envisaged a fiscal and monetary adjustment 
geared at reducing the fiscal3 and current account deficits 
(see Chart 1.1), and inflation. Similarly, far-reaching 
institutional changes were introduced in the monetary 
policy sphere. On the one hand, the political authorities 
sent a draft law to the Congress which modified the 
charter of the Banco Central de la República Argentina 
(BCRA), granting greater independence to the monetary 
authority and prohibiting the BCRA from financing the 
Box 2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF ARGENTINA
SOURCES: Banco de España calculations, based on IMF, Argentina. Fourth Review Under the Stand-by Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 
19/232, July 2019.
a Argentina entered into a Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF which stipulates disbursement in 12 payments. The table was prepared based on the most 
up-to-date information available on the programme’s progress (fourth review, June 2019). The percentages of GDP were calculated using the IMF’s nominal 
GDP forecasts in dollars for each year taken from the World Economic Outlook of October 2019. The IMF’s forecast of Argentina’s nominal GDP for 2021 
is used for the total percentage in the last row.
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Table 1
1   For  the  reasons which  led  to  the  request  for  financial  assistance  from  the  IMF,  see  the  analytical  article  “Argentina:  economic 
challenges in an adverse international setting”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2018, Banco de España.
2   Exports fell by 14% in said quarter. This drop in exports anticipated falls both in expected foreign currency receipts and government 
revenue (see the monetary policy reports of the Banco Central de la República Argentina of October 2018 and January 2019).
3   The target for reducing the primary fiscal balance in 2018 and 2019, stood at 3.8 pp of GDP. Until the fourth review of the programme 
with the IMF (the latest review available) all the quantitative fiscal consolidation targets were met.
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Treasury.4 At the cut-off date of this report, the draft law is 
still pending approval. On the other, inflation targeting was 
abandoned, switching to a system in which the monetary 
base acts as a nominal anchor, so that the benchmark 
interest rate in the money markets becomes an 
endogenous variable of the economy (see Chart  1.2). 
Finally, as regards the Argentine peso/dollar exchange 
rate, an essential variable for inflation expectations, the 
“non-intervention zone”, i.e. the exchange rate band 
within which the currency was initially allowed to float 
freely, was ultimately eliminated at end-April 2019, as a 
result of the financial market turmoil. Consequently, the 
non-intervention zone became known as the “exchange 
rate reference zone”. The difference with the previous 
system of a non-intervention zone lies in the currency no 
longer floating freely within the exchange rate reference 
zone. The BCRA can intervene, even if the exchange rate 
is within the reference zone, if it considers that it is 
excessively volatile.5
Until July 2019, four reviews of the programme were 
completed (see again, Table 1). In these reviews, the IMF 
considered that the programme conditionality was 
generally met. In particular, the public debt sustainability 
analysis performed by the IMF was deemed satisfactory 
and the debt was considered “sustainable but not with a 
high probability”.6
Against this economic and institutional backdrop, in 
August 2019, there was a bout of intense financial pressure. 
This triggered sharp falls in the value of Argentine financial 
assets and of dollar-denominated bank deposits (in the 
two subsequent months, until the end of October, by 
around $11 billion, 2.5% of GDP) (see Chart 1.3), and a 
significant depreciation of the peso/dollar exchange rate. 
One of the direct adverse effects of this negative reaction 
was the increase in the public debt/GDP ratio, since 80% 
of Argentina’s public debt is denominated in foreign 
currency. This also resulted in an increase in the probability 
of default and caused Argentina’s sovereign spread to 
widen by more than 1,000 bp during September.
According to private institutions, the reasons behind this 
bout of financial tension are linked to the result of the 
primary elections7 held in August 2019, which differed 
considerably from the pre-election opinion polls.8 It was 
interpreted that the election outcome could lead to the 
discontinuation of the economic policies pursued in the last 
year following the agreement signed with the IMF. Between 
August and September 2019, the Argentine Government 
adopted a series of economic policy decisions in response 
to this downturn in the financial markets. First, it unveiled a 
package of expansionary fiscal measures.9 Second, it 
announced a plan to reschedule its debt,10 with the 
objective, in particular, of deferring payments and reducing 
Box 2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF ARGENTINA (cont’d)
 4   Under  the current  legal  framework,  the BCRA can finance the Treasury  through temporary advances charged to  future profits, 
irrespective of whether or not these profits materialise. This possibility is eliminated in the draft law. The draft law also stipulates that 
the BCRA shall use any profits generated to settle the temporary advances granted in the past. Once the latter have been redeemed, 
it shall include the profits generated in a reserve fund until the balance of this fund reaches 50% of the BCRA’s capital. Only at this 
time will the BCRA begin to distribute any profits generated to the Treasury’s account.
 5   Under current legislation, the BCRA may sell up to $250 million per day (which represents 0.4% of average international reserves 
in 2018-2019) when the peso/dollar exchange rate is above the upper bound of the exchange rate reference zone (which is set by 
the monetary policy committee).
 6  IMF, Argentina. Fourth Review under the stand-by arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 19/232, July 2019.
 7   These  elections,  which  are  also  known  by  the  Spanish  acronym  PASO  (primary,  open,  simultaneous  and  compulsory),  were 
tantamount to a survey whose sample is practically the same as the population, although participation in the primary elections is 
usually somewhat lower than in the presidential elections.
 8   “El Frente de Todos” (in opposition at that time) obtained more than 47% of the votes, 15 pp more than “Juntos por el Cambio”, 
the coalition which supported the Government.
 9   The cost of the package is estimated at 0.3 pp of GDP. At the cut-off date for this report, the package was still in passage through 
Congress.
10   The measures announced included: 1) obligatory rescheduling of “Letes” dollar-denominated treasury bills, “Lecaps” peso-denominated 
treasury bills, “Lecer” peso-denominated inflation-linked treasury bills and Lelink dollar-linked treasury bills for institutional investors (15% 
will be paid on the date stipulated, 25% after 3 months and 60% after six months); 2) commencement of a legislative process to introduce 
retroactively collective action clauses in government securities under national legislation, in order to only reschedule maturities (without 
haircuts); 3) commencement of agreements with bond holders subject to foreign legislation to reschedule debt maturities falling due in the 
next ten years (without haircuts).
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Box 2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF ARGENTINA (cont’d)
SOURCES: BCRA, INDEC, IMF and Thomson Reuters.
a WEO October 2019 forecasts.
b Until 29 April 2019, "non-intervention zone".
c The first vertical line refers to the signing of the arrangement with the IMF (8 June 2018) and the second vertical line refers to the holding of primary 
elections (11 August 2019).
ARGENTINA FACES CONSIDERABLE CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE WHICH IMPLY HEIGHTENED RISK
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In addition to experiencing a protracted recession (six quarters of zero or negative growth), associated with the reduction of its high current 
account deficit, Argentina is in a situation of high inflation and interest rates. It is facing a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate (entailing 
an increase in public debt, mostly denominated in dollars), a fall in international reserves and a rapid contraction of dollar-denominated 
deposits.
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Box 2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF ARGENTINA (cont’d)
the loss of international reserves as a result of the 
depreciation of the peso. The subsequent implementation 
of capital controls11 pursued the same objective. As is 
customary, these controls have induced the emergence of 
parallel markets with weaker exchange rates than the official 
exchange rate.
The presidential elections at end-October confirmed the 
election of Alberto Fernández (Frente de Todos) as the 
new president of Argentina as from 10 December. The 
negative financial market reaction was of a smaller 
magnitude on this occasion since it had already been 
discounted.
The significant downward revisions of economic growth 
forecasts in recent months, and the upward revisions of 
inflation forecasts (mainly as a result of the exchange rate 
pass-through) (see Chart  1.4) have increased concern 
about the sustainability of Argentina’s public debt which is 
mainly denominated in foreign currency. The introduction 
of capital controls12 and the rescheduling of the shorter-
term debt could allow time to be gained for designing an 
economic programme, but they do not address the 
absence of funding which would allow the Argentine 
government to repay its debt to private agents, as from 
2020, as well as to the IMF in the period 2021-2023. 
Accordingly, the fifth review of the programme, originally 
scheduled for 15 September, did not take place and the 
IMF did not disburse the $5.4  billion envisaged for that 
date. According to statements made by the First Deputy 
Managing Director of the Fund, the IMF is waiting for the 
new government to be formed in order to recommence 
negotiations.
11   The capital controls contained three main measures: 1) the obligation for exporters to repatriate income obtained in foreign currency 
within five days at most (15 days at most in some cases); 2) foreign currency purchases by residents are limited to $10,000 per 
month and by non-residents to $1,000 per month, and 3) companies need a permit to repatriate earnings abroad or to purchase 
foreign currency in the markets. Furthermore, in order to limit speculation increasing the risks of transactions which took advantage 
of the gap between the implied dollar value in securities trades in the stock market and the official exchange rate, the central bank 
and the National Securities Commission imposed the obligation of holding the dollars and securities purchased for at least five days 
before each trade.
12   The day after the elections (28 October), the central bank notably reduced the ceiling on currency purchases by residents (to $200 
per month, if charged to a peso-denominated account and to $100 for cash purchases) and by non-residents (to $100 per month).
